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I. INTRODUCTION 
Aaron Burr was a well-known individual in his time. Among 
other things, he was a patriot, war hero, New York state legislator, 
New York Attorney General, and ultimately Vice President of the 
United States. One measure of his popularity is evinced by the results 
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of the 1800 election for President of the United States, where Burr 
succeeded in obtaining an electoral tie with the eventual victor, 
Thomas Jefferson.1  
However, his considerable reputation was also sensationalized by 
scandal. On the morning of July 11, 1804, Burr shot and killed his 
rival, the equally popular Alexander Hamilton, in duel over an 
insult.2 Although Burr was indicted on charges of murder in two 
states,3 he still managed to finish his term as vice president and 
president of the Senate.4 Then, because he was an outlaw in his own 
state and could not return, he headed south and west, where his 
political ambitions would continue. After purchasing large tracts of 
land in the newly acquired Louisiana territory, he hoped to start a 
war/rebellion against Spain and set himself up as the ruler of a new 
territory.5 Aaron Burr’s imperial ambitions were cut short, however, 
when one of his close confidants betrayed him to President 
Jefferson,6 leading his former Executive co-worker to issue an order 
for his arrest on the crime of treason. 
The sensation of Burr’s high-profile case was overwhelming for 
the new nation.7 Because “the courtroom [was] too small to 
accommodate the crush of interested citizens,” the probable-cause 
hearing had to be “held in the Hall of the House of Delegates in 
Virginia.”8 Chief Justice John Marshall, who presided over this case 
 
 1. They both received 73 of the total 138 electoral votes that were available. For more 
explanation surrounding the first electoral tie, see BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., AARON BURR: 
CONSPIRACY TO TREASON 35–36 (2002). The tie was only broken after a prolonged struggle 
in the House of Representatives, which declared Jefferson president and, “as the Constitution 
then provided,” Burr vice president. William Wirt Henry, The Trial of Aaron Burr, 3 VA. L. 
REV. 477, 479 (Nov. 1897). 
 2. Henry, supra note 1, at 479–80. 
 3. Because the duel occurred in New Jersey and Alexander Hamilton died in New 
York, both states sought to prosecute Aaron Burr. Id. at 480. 
 4. See id. at 481. 
 5. Id. at 481–82 (stating that Mr. Burr purchased 400,000 acres of land along the 
Washita River). 
 6. Id. at 483. 
 7. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal 
Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. 
REV. 39, 48–49 (1996) (“In the midst of this infamous trial, the issue of jury contamination 
erupted. Driven by the public’s curiosity and by Burr’s political stance, the events and 
proceedings leading up to the trial saturated the newspapers, and the possibility of a fair trial 
was in question. Given the nature of the crime and the notoriety of Burr himself, it is easy to 
see why the trial became the center of media attention.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 8. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). 
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as the trial judge while fulfilling his circuit duties, took note of the 
extreme interest and high publicity and became concerned about the 
impartiality and fairness of his court. He remarked: 
Why do personal prejudices constitute a just cause of challenge? 
Solely because the individual who is under their influence is 
presumed to have a bias on his mind which will prevent an 
impartial decision of the case, according to the testimony. He may 
declare that notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined to 
listen to the evidence, and be governed by it; but the law will not 
trust him. . . . He will listen with more favor to that testimony 
which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion . . . .9  
Although Aaron Burr was acquitted, the fear that the negative 
publicity normally associated with high-profile cases might divest an 
individual of his or her right to a fair trial has remained present in 
American society.  
Two hundred years later in United States v. Wecht,10 Judge 
Arthur Schwab, facing one of the highest profile cases of his career 
on the bench, sought to protect the impartiality of his tribunal by 
ordering that the names and addresses of both jurors and prospective 
jurors be sealed until after the empanelment of the jury.11 Media-
intervenors appealed that order, claiming that their First Amendment 
right of access entitled them to such juror information. The Third 
Circuit agreed with the reporters, quashed Judge Schwab’s order, 
and effectively placed the measure that he used to protect the fairness 
of his court beyond the discretionary reach of any trial judge under 
its jurisdiction.12 More importantly, the media’s right of access not 
only trumped the judge’s method for ensuring an impartial trial, it 
also trumped the rights of the accused to a fair trial.  
Normally, as two conflicting rights meet, one will go dormant as 
the other is honored. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Burson v. 
Freeman13 illustrates this principle when he notes that “the First 
Amendment permits freedom of expression to yield to the extent 
necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional right.”14 
 
 9. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g). 
 10. United States v. Wecht, No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 65605 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2008). 
 11. Id. at *2 n.1. 
 12. See United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 233–43 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 13. 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
 14. Id. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the majority in its holding that the 
government may legally ban political speech within certain distances from polling stations in 
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To illustrate further, it may be helpful to think of each right as an 
automobile. If two automobiles arrive at an intersection 
simultaneously, only one may proceed through the intersection at a 
time if either is to continue on its way unhindered. Customarily, 
road signs and rights-of-way determine which vehicle will proceed 
first, so as to ensure order and safety. Likewise, constitutional 
priorities and prudence determine which right must yield to another 
at points of intersection. Certainly, the circumstances as well as the 
particular rights involved also play an important role in that 
determination. However, when courts imprudently give priority to 
the wrong right, this inevitably causes catastrophic consequences 
when the right that is supposed to have the “right-of-way” comes 
speeding up to an intersection.  
In United States v. Wecht, the Third Circuit incorrectly forced 
the rights of the accused to yield to the press’s right of access, in 
spite of constitutional and prudential considerations to the 
contrary.15 This Note will examine how Wecht’s imprudent 
application of right of access jurisprudence—specifically the two-
prong Press-Enterprise II test—effectively runs an individual’s rights 
to a fair and impartial trial “off the road,” as well as sets barriers that 
impede those rights from resuming their proper course. Although 
there are ample arguments that the Third Circuit misapplied the 
history prong of the Press-Enterprise II16 test by misinterpreting the 
historical availability of juror identities,17 this Note will instead focus 
on the misapplication of the logic prong of the Press-Enterprise II 
test, as well as the imprudent results of the decision.18  
Part II of this Note will build a foundation for this argument by 
introducing and juxtaposing the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to 
a fair trial with the developing First Amendment right of access. In 
 
order to prevent election fraud and intimidation, which otherwise would infringe on a 
recognized, fundamental right to vote). 
 15. See Wecht, 537 F.3d at 243 (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 16. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 17. See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc) 
(“Because the system contemplates that jurors will inconspicuously fade back into the 
community once their tenure is completed, anonymity would seem entirely consistent with, 
rather than anathema to, the jury concept.”); see also Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 518 N.E.2d 930 
(N.Y. 1987) (holding that a statute designed to protect the confidentiality of juror 
questionnaires also protected the confidentiality of juror names and addresses because of the 
significant privacy and safety interests at stake). 
 18. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
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Part III, this Note will provide some background leading up to the 
Wecht decision, as well as discuss how the Third Circuit came to its 
conclusion. Part IV will begin by discussing how this decision alters 
the “right-of-way” priorities essential to jury trials by shifting the 
paradigmatic focus of the jury trial away from providing an impartial 
forum to serve justice and toward creating a government showcase of 
fairness for the public. It will then explain the foreseeable harm 
caused by this error. Finally, this Note will conclude after offering a 
way to redirect traffic and fix the problem. 
II. SETTING THE COURSE FOR A COLLISION OF RIGHTS 
A. The Right to a Trial by an Impartial Jury 
In AD 1215, a group of fed-up English barons at Runnymede 
successfully coerced King John of England to sign the Magna 
Charta. The Great Charter is recognized as one of the first 
documents to “wrest[] from English sovereigns”19 many of the 
fundamental and natural rights enjoyed by citizens of republican 
societies. Among other things, the document requires that “[n]o 
free-man shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or 
outlawed, or in any way destroyed; nor . . . condemn[ed] . . . , 
nor . . . commit[ed] . . . to prison, excepting by the legal judgment of 
his peers, or by the laws of the land.”20  
Possibly due to one of the many alleged abuses that the Framers 
laid at the feet of their former sovereign,21 Americans chiseled these 
ideas into the tablets of their own jurisprudence by incorporating 
them into the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment assures that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,”22 and the Fifth 
Amendment maintains that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”23 Today, 
 
 19. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 114 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 20. BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF 
ENGLAND 239 (1900) (quoting Chapter 39 of the Magna Charta of 1215) (emphasis added). 
 21. The Declaration of Independence lists “depriving us in many cases, of the benefits 
of Trial by Jury” as one of the many grievances that the colonists maintained against the 
English King, George III. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
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people do not question the right of the criminally accused to have an 
impartial jury. “[R]egardless of whether the Sixth Amendment 
requires [states to provide defendants a jury trial, if a jury is 
provided], the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent 
commanded by the Sixth Amendment,”24 and due process, at a 
minimum, requires that any individual accused of a crime be 
accorded a fair trial before a fair tribunal.25 
Judges are the primary guardians of the right to a fair trial. This, 
of course, means that judges maintain more than just the authority 
to ensure proper conduct during a trial and determine questions of 
law.26 They also reserve the power, and with that the duty, of 
supervising and controlling the course of the trial process in such a 
manner as to prevent injustice.27 Exercising their “sound discretion,” 
judges may take actions to restrict the representation of individuals,28 
disallow the withdrawal of representation in criminal cases,29 limit the 
presence of the press during judicial proceedings,30 impose control 
over statements made to the news media by both counsel and 
witnesses,31 and take actions to insulate a jury when the fairness of a 
trial is threatened.32  
 
 24. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
466, 471–72 (1965)). 
 25. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268–
72 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523–26 (1927) (holding that a judge may not be 
an arbiter in a case in which he or she has a direct interest). 
 26. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86–87 (1976). 
 27. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (“The courts must take such 
steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside 
interferences.”). 
 28. Rhines v. Norlarco Credit Union, 847 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) 
(stating that judges may restrain parties from contracting with non-attorneys for their 
representation). 
 29. See Fondura v. Florida, 940 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]s long 
as the attorney-client relation has not deteriorated to a point where counsel can no longer give 
effective aid in the fair presentation of a defense, [courts are] justified in denying a motion to 
withdraw.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 30. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358 (“[T]he presence of the press at judicial proceedings 
must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or 
disadvantaged.”). 
 31. See id. at 360 (stating that in the circumstances of that case, the judge should have 
“impos[ed] control over the statements made to the news media by counsel, witnesses . . . and 
police officers”). 
 32. See id. at 363 (“The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will 
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.”). 
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Nevertheless, the seemingly unlimited power of judicial 
discretion is not boundless. First, judicial discretion is guided “by the 
legal and moral conventions that mold the acceptable concept of 
right and justice.”33 Justice Cardozo noted that when a judge 
exercises his or her discretion,  
[h]e is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is 
not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated 
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, 
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 
“the primordial necessity of order in the social life.” Wide enough 
in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.34 
Second, and more importantly, the absolute rights of a party 
form an impassible limit to a judge’s discretion.35 Herein lies the 
current problem. Granting new rights to individuals, especially those 
who are not parties to a controversy, further restricts the boundaries 
of a judge’s discretion, limiting his or her capacity to affect the 
outcome of a trial, and possibly denying an individual one of his or 
her most basic due process rights36—especially when that new right is 
granted primacy over a pre-existing right. 
B. The First Amendment and the Right of Access 
In Wecht, the Third Circuit placed the right to a fair trial in 
direct conflict with the First Amendment’s Freedom of the Press. 
The First Amendment guarantees that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . .”37 Under certain 
circumstances,38 this freedom has translated into a “right of access” 
for media representatives.39 
 
 33. Matire v. State, 232 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). 
 34. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 
(1921) (footnote omitted). 
 35. Tuck v. State, 231 S.W.2d 436, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950). 
 36. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 38. While it is generally understood that the press’s right of access extends to criminal 
trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980), it is still difficult 
to determine where else, and how far, this right extends. Compare Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817, 833–34 (1974) (rejecting the press’s demand to conduct face-to-face interviews of prison 
inmates because the press’s right of access is no greater than the public’s), with Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting 
that the press should be permitted “some” right of access to the jail in order to cover its inner 
workings). Compare City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285, 291–92 (Wis. 1989) 
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According to Justice Potter Stewart, “The primary purpose of 
the constitutional guarantee of a free press was . . . to create a fourth 
institution outside the Government as an additional check on the 
three official branches.”40 This fourth branch, or fourth estate as it is 
often called,41 grants the masses access to the government and its 
dealings by attending those dealings as their proxy. The transparency 
that this creates allows a more “informed citizenry” to make 
“[e]nlightened choice[s]”42 when it comes time to exercise their 
political rights. Consequently, some argue that the right of access is 
an essential component of self-government.43 
1. Richmond Newspapers: The emergence of a competing interest to the 
rights of the accused 
This right of access extends to the court system. In Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that “[a]bsent 
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal 
case must be open to the public.”44  
During the initial trial in Richmond Newspapers, John Paul 
Stevenson was convicted of murder.45 However, because the trial 
court had improperly permitted a bloodstained shirt, among some 
other very incriminating items, to be entered into the record, the 
Virginia Supreme Court overturned the initial ruling.46 The local 
newspapers caught onto this detail and included the inadmissible 
evidence in a story.47 As a consequence, both the first and second 
 
(reasonably excluding the media from an airplane crash scene is not a violation of the First 
Amendment right of access), with Florida Publ’g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 917–18 
(Fla. 1976) (accompanying a fire marshal into a burned-out private home was not a trespass 
because it was “common usage, custom and practice for news media”). 
 39. Richard J. Ovelmen, et al., Access, in 3 COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 415 (Bruce P. Keller & Lee Levine eds., 2009) (“[C]ourts have long eschewed any 
‘narrow, literal conception’ of the Amendment’s terms . . . on the theory the Framers were 
concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a background of shared values and 
practices.” (citation omitted)). 
 40.  Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 43. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 617 (describing the views of Justice Brennan). 
 44. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980). 
 45. See id. at 559. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 559 n.1. 
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retrials ended in mistrial.48 When on trial for the fourth time, Mr. 
Stevenson’s attorney moved to close the proceedings to the public, 
citing the possibility of further juror interference by those in 
attendance.49 In light of the circumstances, the judge was acting 
within his power by closing the court to the public (and the press) to 
ensure that the defendant received a fair trial, as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.50 
However, after the media-intervenors carried their case all the 
way to the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment was no longer the 
sole point upon which this issue would turn. Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Burger explained that “throughout its evolution, the 
[jury] trial has been open to all who cared to observe.”51 In fact, 
criminal trials once served an “important prophylactic purpose, 
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion” 
after the shock of a crime52—a purpose which is only served when 
the “criminal process ‘satisf[ies] the appearance of justice.’”53 
However, times have since changed. Now, because the public no 
longer finds trial attendance to be a preferred pastime, the media 
operates as “surrogates for the public,”54 serving to “satisfy the 
appearance of justice”55 because “openness, fairness, and the 
perception of fairness”56 are so closely connected. Therefore, “a 
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of [the] criminal 
trial under our system of justice.”57  
Proceeding from this presumption of openness, Chief Justice 
Burger found that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in 
the guarantees of the First Amendment.”58 Furthermore, according 
to the Chief Justice, and although it is not specifically enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights, “the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees 
of speech and press” have traditionally protected the right of access 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 559–60. 
 50. See supra Part I.A. 
 51. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564. 
 52. Id. at 571. 
 53. Id. at 571–72 (quoting Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
 54. Id. at 573. 
 55. Id. at 572 (citation omitted). 
 56. Id. at 570–71. 
 57. Id. at 573. 
 58. Id. at 580. 
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to public places.59 Because the right of assembly also acts as an 
important catalyst to the exercise of other First Amendment rights, 
the government may not inhibit access to public fora outside of 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.60 Therefore, since 
the “trial courtroom . . . is a public place[,] . . . the people 
generally—and representatives of the media—have a right to be 
present,” as guaranteed by the First Amendment.61 
Although Chief Justice Burger failed to see the right of access 
and the right to a fair trial as necessarily being in tension,62 this 
judgment represents the beginning of a paradigm shift in jury trial 
jurisprudence, which Wecht might make complete if it takes root.63 
Since Richmond Newspapers, the “structural role” of the press64 has 
become more robust, being held to apply to much more than just 
the criminal trial itself. Courts have construed the First Amendment 
right of access for media observers of criminal trials to extend to voir 
dire proceedings,65 preliminary hearings and their transcripts,66 
suppression hearings,67 deposition proceedings,68 and even bench 
conferences.69 When the rule is applied in the extreme, courts cannot 
even exclude the general press and public from the courtroom 
 
 59. Id. at 577. 
 60. Id. at 578. 
 61. Id. 
 62. In fact, Chief Justice Burger later noted, “[O]ne of the important means of assuring 
a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986). 
 63. Infra Part IV.A.  
 64. See generally Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that the First Amendment has a structural role in the American form of 
government). 
 65. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510–13 
(1984) (rejecting a generalized interest in protecting the privacy of prospective jurors). 
 66. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986). 
 67. See, e.g., State v. Sharrow, 29 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 2503, 2504 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
2001) (holding that the defendant’s concerns as to the impartiality of the trial did not 
outweigh the media’s First Amendment rights of access); State v. Demrey, 22 Media L. Rptr. 
(BNA) 2383, 2384 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1994) (denying the defendant’s motion to close pretrial 
hearing on the admissibility of evidence under both state and federal constitutional standards). 
 68. See, e.g., State v. List, 17 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1680, 1680 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990) (granting to the media the right to be present during the taped deposition of a 
defense witness). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1986) (“We hold . . . 
that the common law right of access to judicial records . . . is fully applicable to transcripts of 
sidebar or chambers conferences in criminal cases at which evidentiary or other substantive 
rulings have been made.”). 
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during the testimony of minor-victims of sexual crimes, even if the 
public should wish to protect the young victims from such 
publicity.70 
2. Press-Enterprise II: The current test for determining the right of 
access to criminal trials  
The current standard for determining the breadth of the right of 
access to criminal trial proceedings is a two-prong test that was 
handed down in Press-Enterprise II. In that case, a former nurse was 
charged with the murder of twelve hospital patients.71 When 
preliminary hearings began, counsel for the nurse moved that the 
court exclude the public from those hearings on the grounds that it 
would be prejudicial to his client’s case.72 In addition to closing the 
hearing, the magistrate sealed the record after the media sought 
access to the transcripts of those proceedings.73 When the California 
Supreme Court examined the issue, it reasoned that it was 
distinguishable from other right of access precedent because the 
preliminary hearings were not the actual trial proceedings, and 
because the exclusion motion concerned the rights of the accused to 
a fair and impartial trial, not the privacy interests of witnesses74 or 
potential jury members.75 As a result, the California Supreme Court 
found no First Amendment right of access. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, did not agree. In 
overturning the decision of the California Supreme Court, the Court 
set out a two-prong test for determining whether a hearing must be 
open to the public, regardless of whether the hearing is officially part 
of the “trial.” First, the “experience” prong asks a court to examine 
the history of any proceeding in question so as to determine whether 
 
 70. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607–09 (1982) (holding a 
Massachusetts law requiring the exclusion of the press and the general public from the 
courtroom during the testimony of minors who have allegedly been victim to sexual abuse to 
be unconstitutional because the provision was mandatory and did not allow for a case-by-case 
determination). 
 71. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 3. 
 72. Id. at 3–4.  
 73. Id. at 4–5. 
 74. Id. at 5 (referring to Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607–09 (considering the privacy 
of minor victims of sexual crimes)). 
 75. Id. (referring to Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 
U.S. 501, 510–11 (1984) (considering the privacy of jurors and other third parties)). 
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it has traditionally been open to the press or general public.76 
Second, the “logic” prong requires a court to consider “whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question”77 by “enhanc[ing] both the basic 
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so 
essential to the public confidence in the system.”78 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger found that under this 
test, the First Amendment requires preliminary proceedings to be 
open to the public. Satisfying the experience prong, the Court found 
that a common law “tradition of accessibility to preliminary hearings 
of [this] . . . type” already existed in California.79 Furthermore, 
appealing to both the logic prong of the test, as well as answering 
objections that the ruling placed the rights of the accused in further 
tension with rights of access, Chief Justice Burger found that “the 
absence of a jury [from preliminary hearings] . . . makes the 
importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more 
significant.”80 Essentially, the proceedings needed to remain open 
because public exposure was one important means for assuring their 
impartiality.81 
III. MEETING AT THE INTERSECTION: UNITED STATES V. WECHT 
Obviously, Wecht is not the first time that the right of the 
accused to an impartial trial and the right of the press to access 
government proceedings have met at an intersection. The result of 
such an encounter, however, is what sets this case apart. It thus 
becomes important to understand the facts surrounding this 
meeting, as well as the Third Circuit’s reasoning in determining 
which right deserves to be given the “right-of-way.” Therefore, this 
Part will first provide some background to United States v. Wecht, 
before proceeding to the outcome of the case, where the right to an 
impartial trial was forced to yield to the right of access. 
 
 76. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 9 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 501) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 79. Id. at 10. 
 80. Id. at 12–13. 
 81. Id. at 7. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/12/2010 5:47:47 PM 
995 Failure to Yield 
 1007 
A. Background 
1. The celebrity pathologist 
On January 20, 2006, when Dr. Cyril Wecht was indicted on 
eighty-four federal counts,82 he was already popularly known as the 
“celebrity coroner.”83 Having received professional degrees in law 
and medicine, the former Allegheny County Coroner was a frequent 
news and talk show guest widely known for his work. Some of his 
early cases include the deaths of Marilyn Monroe and Elvis Presley.84 
Consequently, Dr. Wecht’s fame, or notoriety, was already well 
established by the time he was appointed to the House of 
Representatives’ Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978 to 
investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. As part of 
that committee, he continued to establish his reputation by 
consistently disagreeing with the findings of the other eight forensic 
pathologists on the committee.85 Since then, he has worked on many 
other high-profile cases, such as the death of JonBenét Ramsey,86 the 
Charles Manson murders,87 and the O.J. Simpson murder trial.88  
Moreover, this indictment was not the first time that Dr. Wecht 
had been in trouble with the law. More than two decades earlier, Dr. 
Wecht was indicted on similar charges.89 In 1979, on the same day 
that he “announced his candidacy for county commissioner,” Dr. 
Wecht was accused of using the public facilities available to him as 
 
 82. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 224 (3d Cir. 2008). Among the eighty-four 
counts were charges of “theft of honest services, mail and wire fraud,” and using public 
resources for private gain. Id. 
 83. See Amy Worden, Celebrity Coroner on Trial Today, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 28, 
2008 at B01; United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 541 F.3d 493, 495 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 84. Harriet Ryan, Cyril Wecht’s Next Big Case Might Be His Own, CNN.com, Sept. 25, 
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/25/cyril.wecht/index.html.  
 85. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1828, pt. 2, at 43 n.1 (1979), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1a.html#reliance.  
 86. Joe Mandak, Feds Again Reducing Counts Against Top Pathologist, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 7, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-11-07-
738337286_x.htm. 
 87. Famed Coroner to Give Talk, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Nov. 6, 2005. 
 88. Id. 
 89. James O’Toole, Wecht No Stranger to Controversy, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 
2006, at A1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06021/641949.stm (stating that 
Dr. Wecht had been previously prosecuted for allegedly using his office perquisites for his own 
private enterprises). 
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county coroner for his own private gain.90 Although he was acquitted 
of any criminal charges, he was later found liable under similar claims 
in a civil trial.91 
2. The scandal surrounding the case at issue  
The circumstances surrounding Dr. Wecht’s latest trial only add 
to his tabloid reputation. This fiasco began with a series of 
arguments between Dr. Wecht and the Allegheny District 
Attorney.92 According to reports, the Allegheny District Attorney 
refused to investigate some deaths that had occurred during police 
encounters, or to prosecute the officers involved.93 Consequently, 
Dr. Wecht exercised his functions as a private, for-hire pathologist 
and issued a medical opinion for a civil suit against those officers.94 
Accusing him of using his public office for gain, the District Attorney 
opened an investigation that would eventually result in Dr. Wecht’s 
federal indictment. 
However, many observers would declare that this indictment and 
investigation, announced during the 2006 election year, was 
politically motivated.95 Richard L. Thornburgh, a Republican, former 
U.S. Attorney General, former Governor of Pennsylvania, and 
attorney for Dr. Wecht, even testified before the House Judiciary 
Committee that Dr. Wecht was one among many other prominent 
Democrats to be the subject of a Republican witch-hunt under 
disgraced former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.96 Even after 
Dr. Wecht’s first trial reached a conclusion, many members of the 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The District Attorney at the time was Stephen A. Zappala Jr. and it appears that Dr. 
Wecht and the D.A. are still feuding. Jeremy Boren, Wecht’s Charges Against Zappala Reopen 
Feud, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/ 
pittsburghtrib/news/pittsburgh/s_660862.html. 
 93. See Charlie Deitch, The Wecht Files, PITT. CITY PAPER, Dec. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.pittsburghcitypaper.ws/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A39852.  
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., id.; Jason Cato, Prosecution’s Conduct in Wecht Case Labeled ‘Troubling,’ 
PITT. TRIB.-REV., Apr. 12, 2008, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/ 
pittsburghtrib/news/s_562027.html. 
 96. Mary Beth Buchanan was the U.S. Attorney who eventually took the case. She had 
previously served under Attorneys General John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales as director of 
the Executive Office for United States Attorneys in Washington, D.C., from 2004 to 2005. See 
Philip Shenon, Democrats Were Targets in Inquiries, Panel is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, 
at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/washington/24prosecute.html.  
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hung jury left with the impression that the prosecution was 
fundamentally politically driven.97  
Because of these conditions, and the resulting “intense and 
‘unprecedented’ . . . pretrial publicity” surrounding the 
controversy,98 U.S. District Court Judge Arthur Schwab decided to 
empanel an anonymous jury in accordance with a federal statute that 
permits a judge to “keep [juror] names confidential in any case where 
the interests of justice so require.”99 Under these terms, the voir dire 
process and the entire trial would be open to the public, keeping 
only the jury’s identifying information confidential.100 In spite of 
some open accusations of witness tampering on the part of Dr. 
Wecht,101 the judge noted that he did not consider such interior 
influences when making his order.102 It was, in fact, solely because of 
the “local ambience” of frenzied speculation that he did so, with the 
hope of maintaining an impartial court.103 The judge also made it 
clear that his decision was made to ensure a fair process while 
respecting the public and the media’s right of access.104  
B. United States v. Wecht 
Notwithstanding the openness of the process in Wecht, when the 
media’s objection to the innominate jury reached the Third Circuit 
on appeal, the court of appeals sided with the media.105 To come to 
 
 97. Carl Prine & Jason Cato, FBI’s Calls Upset Jurors in Wecht Trial, PITT. TRIB.-REV., 
Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/ 
cityregion/s_561792.html.  
 98. United States v. Wecht, No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 219314, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 
2008). 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (b)(7) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 100. See United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 101. Jason Cato, Wecht Threats Alleged, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Feb. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_425208.html. 
 102. United States v. Wecht, No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 65605, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 
2008). 
 103. See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[In certain 
circumstances] we must be particularly deferential to the trial judge, familiar as he is with the 
local ambience.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 26–36. 
 104. See United States v. Wecht, No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 199465, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 
22, 2008) (holding that the court would not “cloak the public voir dire process in secrecy,” 
but that it would only exercise its discretion to restrict the public’s access to the potential jury 
members for “legitimate reasons”); United States v. Wecht, No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 219314, 
at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 26–36. 
 105. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 227. 
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its conclusion, the Third Circuit applied the two-prong experience 
and logic test outlined in Press-Enterprise II to the release of juror 
names and identities, because “history and experience shape the 
functioning of governmental processes” and “[i]f the particular 
proceeding in question passes [the] tests of experience and logic, a 
qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.”106 
When examining the experience prong of the test, the Wecht 
court noted the fact that the juror selection process has traditionally 
been open.107 For the court, this implied that the names and 
addresses of the jurors have always been available to the public.108 
According to the Third Circuit’s findings, the very concept of 
anonymous juries was all but non-existent before the mid-twentieth 
century.109 Consequently, the Third Circuit did not feel that this 
practice satisfied the experience prong.110  
Proceeding to the logic prong of the test, the Third Circuit 
echoed many of the previously enumerated goals of the right of 
access when it observed that “[k]nowledge of juror identities allows 
the public to verify the impartiality of key participants in the 
administration of justice, and thereby ensures fairness, the 
 
 106. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 
(1986); see also Wecht, 537 F.3d at 235–42 (discussing and applying Press-Enterprise II). 
 107. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 235. 
 108. Id. (“Because juries have historically been selected from local populations in which 
most people have known each other . . . the traditional public nature of voir dire strongly 
suggests that jurors’ identities were public as well.”); see also In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 
F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1998) (“When the jury system grew up with juries of the vicinage, 
everybody knew everybody on the jury . . .” so that the required disclosure of juror and 
prospective juror names is “no more than an application of what has always been the law . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); Robert Lloyd Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror’s 
Identity, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 357, 370 (1990) (“An examination of historical tradition indicates 
that jurors’ identities and places of residence traditionally have been known to the public.”); 
David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy 
Opinions, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1997). 
 109. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 236; see also Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The 
Anonymous Jury: Jury Tampering by Another Name?, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 14 (1994) (“Juror 
anonymity is an innovation that was unknown to the common law and to American 
jurisprudence in its first two centuries.”). One of the earliest cases of an anonymous jury that is 
mentioned in this case is a Ninth Circuit approval of a 1951 district court order that prohibited 
the pre-trial release of juror names and addresses to anyone. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 
274, 278–79 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 110. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 237 (“[A] proper analysis of ‘experience’ will evaluate trial 
practices as they have developed over the past millennium in courts at all levels . . . .”) (citing 
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8). 
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appearance of fairness and public confidence in that system.”111 In 
addition, the court found that more factors weighed in favor of 
mandating disclosure than allowing judges to exercise their 
discretion in releasing juror information. Although the Third Circuit 
recognized some of the risks associated with always disclosing juror 
identities,112 it felt that there is a strong presumption that all juror 
and prospective juror identities must be released for two reasons:113 
(1)”[j]uror bias or confusion might be uncovered, and jurors’ 
understanding and response to judicial proceedings could be 
investigated”114 as a result of open access; and (2) “the prospect of 
criminal justice being routinely meted out by unknown persons does 
not comport with democratic values of accountability and 
openness . . . .”115 While the court did not make the release of juror 
names an absolute rule, it left little choice to trial judges as they 
would have to overcome strict scrutiny in order to withhold juror 
identities,116 a standard which many scholars recognize as practically 
impossible to meet.117 
IV. THE COLLISION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
In sum, Wecht’s holding requires district judges in the Third 
Circuit to release the names and identifying information of jurors 
and prospective jurors before their empanelment in a jury. The broad 
 
 111. Id. at 238 (quoting In re Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st 
Cir. 1990)) (quotations omitted). 
 112. The Third Circuit felt that possible risks of disclosure could be subjecting the jurors 
to the influence of third parties, the possible resistance of jurors from “serving on high-profile 
cases” in order to avoid public scrutiny, and the increased risk of jurors lying during voir dire in 
order to avoid public embarrassment. Id. 
 113. Id. at 239. 
 114. Id. (quoting In re Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 94) (quotations omitted). 
 115. Id. (quoting In re Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 98) (quotations omitted). 
 116. Id. (holding that judges must, on a case-by-case basis, “make particularized findings 
on the record ‘establishing the existence of a compelling government interest’ and 
‘demonstrating that absent limited restrictions on the right of access, that other interest would 
be substantially impaired’” in order to empanel an anonymous jury) (quoting United States v. 
Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 117. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries & R. Craig Wood, Rights Without Remedies: The 
Consequences of Tennessee v. Lane for Disabled State University Students, 195 EDUC. LAW. 
REP. 697, 707 (2005) (noting that once the Supreme Court has found a right to be 
fundamental and applies strict scrutiny, the test becomes “almost impossible to meet”); Ronnie 
J. Fisher, Comment, “What’s in a Name?”: An Attempt to Resolve the “Analytic Ambiguity” of 
the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICK. L. REV. 639, 660 (2003) (observing that 
the strict scrutiny test of the Supreme Court is a “nearly-impossible-to-pass” form of review). 
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consequences of this decision, however, extend much further than a 
simple restriction on judicial discretion.  
This new, more liberal interpretation of Richmond Newspapers 
has expanded the right of access too far. By improperly signaling that 
the right of access has priority at its intersection with the right to a 
fair trial, the Third Circuit has caused a tremendous collision. Not 
only does this decision diminish the essential purpose of the 
American court system and jury trials by pushing aside basic rights of 
fairness and impartiality in favor of “openness” for a media-hungry 
public, it also places barriers that impede the system from adapting 
to future circumstances. This Part will focus on these issues in turn 
by first addressing the declining rights of the accused in the criminal 
trial process. Then, this Part will bring to light the adverse effects 
that this decision may have on the courts by exposing how Wecht 
completes the paradigm shift begun in Richmond Newspapers—
exchanging the former primary purpose of the jury trial, that of 
providing an impartial tribunal for the accused, with the new 
purpose of providing “an appearance of openness” for the public. 
Subsequently, this Part will go on to explain how Wecht’s 
exaggerated interpretation of Richmond Newspapers will lead to the 
fossilization of this aspect of the court system in the face of an ever-
changing public and media, further obstructing the system’s quest to 
preserve the rights of the accused.  
A. Shifting Paradigms: The Forgotten Purpose of the Jury Trial 
What is the primary purpose of public jury trials? In an otherwise 
lengthy dissent, Justice Gray answered this question in 1895 by 
stating that it was “to secure impartial justice between the 
government and the accused in each case as it arose.”118 The 
Supreme Court has since affirmed and reaffirmed this position, 
stating that the primary purpose of the jury trial “is to prevent 
oppression by the Government,” because allowing the accused the 
right to a trial by a jury of his or her peers grants him or her “an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor 
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”119 Essentially, 
 
 118. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 175 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting). 
 119. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 100 (1970)) (quotation omitted); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 
(1972); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
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criminal trials by jury were created “for the benefit”120 and 
protection of the accused,121 preserving their constitutional rights 
from abuse by guaranteeing an impartial tribunal. 
However, since Richmond Newspapers, ancillary goals for 
criminal trials have come into view.122 Now, because there is a 
“nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness,” 
courts are necessarily required to “satisfy the appearance of justice” 
by allowing general access to their courtrooms during trial 
proceedings.123 Nevertheless, previous to the Wecht decision, these 
goals were either ancillary to the primary purpose of providing an 
impartial trial,124 or complimentary to that purpose. For example, in 
Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court recognized that access to pre-
trial proceedings not only grants the appearance of openness, but it 
is also necessary for the protection of a defendant’s rights in a 
situation where there is not yet a jury of his or her peers to do so.125 
Indeed, it would appear that the secondary principle of openness was 
originally meant to be subordinate to the principal goal of 
maintaining fairness in the courtroom; Richmond Newspapers did not 
establish “a First Amendment right of access to all aspects of all 
criminal trials under all circumstances.”126  
Using his discretion to withhold juror identities in Wecht, Judge 
Schwab’s order was meant to meet the primary objective of 
impartiality while appeasing the secondary objective of openness. 
Notably, Judge Schwab’s order did not affect the access of the press 
or public to trial proceedings. Presumably, journalists and observers 
 
 120. 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY & WALTER CARRINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
647 (8th ed. 1927); see also Note, The Right to a Public Trial in Criminal Cases, 41 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1138, 1156 (1966) (“Despite the importance of the public’s interest, however, it does 
not appear that a public right is ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental,’ particularly in view of the uncertain status of this right in the 
majority of the state courts.”). 
 121. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A. J. 534, 538 (1965). 
 122. See supra Part II.B. 
 123. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570, 572 (1980) (quotation 
omitted). 
 124. Nancy T. Gardner, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for State Criminal Trials, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 475, 494 (1985) (“The primary purpose of a criminal trial is to provide the 
defendant with an impartial forum in which the truth will emerge, not to educate or entertain 
the public.” (footnote omitted)). 
 125. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 12–13 
(1986). 
 126. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 613 (1982) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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were permitted to sit through voir dire as well as any other hearing, 
and at the end of the trial they would be able to review the Jury 
Questionnaire used preliminary to voir dire proceedings.127 
Consequently, the parties and observers would know practically 
everything about the jurors, with the sole exception of their 
names.128 Under these circumstances, the presumption of openness 
during the proceedings, or at least openness under the 
circumstances, is easily identifiable. 
Furthermore, other learned judges also recognize Judge 
Schwab’s order to be an appropriate method of ensuring the 
impartiality of his tribunal while still respecting the media’s 
secondary right of access to the trial. For example, after holding that 
the complete closure of voir dire proceedings to protect the 
impartiality of the jury was unconstitutional, the Second Circuit 
proclaimed in dictum that limited closure, such as “simply 
concealing the identities of . . . prospective jurors” would satisfy 
Press-Enterprise I and II limitations.129 In addition, Judge Van 
Antwerpen’s dissent in Wecht found that Judge Schwab’s method 
was an appropriate compromise when weighing “the public’s interest 
in openness, the media’s interest in knowing certain information . . . 
and the judicial system’s interest in fairness and efficiency.”130 
Compared to sequestration—“one of the most burdensome tools of 
the many available to assure a fair trial”131—this method was “far 
more accommodating to the Media-Intervenors, as well as far less 
burdensome on the jurors.”132 
Nevertheless, because the Wecht decision ignores the primary 
purpose of a jury trial in order to appease the media, it represents a 
paradigm shift as priorities among these constitutional rights are 
 
 127. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 226 (2008). 
 128. Id. at 226 n.3. 
 129. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2004); Gannet Co. v. State, 
571 A.2d 735, 751 (Del. 1989) (holding that the announcement of juror names was not 
necessary to provide constitutionally required openness in highly publicized trial proceedings). 
 130. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 266 (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 131. Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1977); State v. Smart, 622 A.2d 
1197, 1209–10 (N.H. 1993) (“Sequestration is ‘an extreme measure, one of the most 
burdensome tools of the many available to assure a fair trial.’” (quoting United States v. 
Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753, 755 (1st Cir. 1981)); see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 
1030, 1057 (1991). 
 132. Wecht, 537 F.3d at 267 (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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reorganized. Prior to Wecht, judges in the Third Circuit were first 
required to “take protective measures [to safeguard the due process 
rights of the accused,] even when they are not strictly and 
inescapably necessary.”133 The focus of their discretionary actions was 
the protection of the accused. Now, judges are required to take 
measures, or are restrained from action, in order to maintain 
openness—a right more significantly tied to the rights of the 
observers than the accused.134 Moreover, Wecht signals that these 
third-party rights are to be favored even at the expense of the 
accused.  
It is certain that “[t]he First Amendment right of access cannot 
be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive 
the defendant of [the right to an impartial verdict].”135 However, 
when the Third Circuit decided that preliminary access to juror 
names is included in the right of access, in spite of the apparent 
openness guaranteed even when juror information was not released, 
it imprudently changed the priorities of the judicial system. This 
change works to the disadvantage of the criminally accused who may 
risk life and liberty under biased processes. 
B. Setting the System Up for Failure 
In addition to this rash realigning of priorities, if the Third 
Circuit’s improper application of the Press-Enterprise II test is 
adopted elsewhere, it will imprudently place the court system out of 
touch with an increasingly changing world. In In re Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press,136 then-Judge Scalia expounded 
upon the two-prong test, explaining that the crucial logic prong 
requires  
that the historical practice play “an essential role” in the proper 
functioning of government . . . since otherwise the most trivial and 
unimportant historical practices—for example, the courts’ earlier 
practice of reading their judgments aloud in open session—would 
be chiselled [sic] in constitutional stone.137 
 
 133. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979). 
 134. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (“[T]he press 
and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials.”). 
 135. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986). 
 136. 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 137. Id. at 1332 (emphasis added). 
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Even more alarming is the proposition that an unessential yet 
encumbering historical practice could become equally unalterable. 
The practice affirmed by Wecht is both unessential and burdensome 
because the practice duplicates voir dire proceedings and forces 
judges to resort to more cumbersome procedures for ensuring a fair 
trial, such as sequestration. 
1. Surrendering process: Giving voir dire to the press 
First, the Third Circuit’s decision in Wecht represents the 
adoption of a requirement that is plainly superfluous.  
The Wecht Court felt that permitting press access to juror names 
would “allow[] the public to verify the impartiality of key 
participants in the administration of justice” as well as uncover 
“[j]uror bias or confusion.”138 Consequently, it felt that the logic 
prong of the Press-Enterprise II test required the disclosure of juror 
names and addresses. Although requiring the disclosure of juror and 
prospective juror names and addresses could feasibly attain those 
listed goals, such an analysis completely overlooks the essentiality 
requirement of the prong.  
The American system already has a method for verifying the 
impartiality of jurors: voir dire. For several hundred years,139 voir dire 
has worked to serve the three-fold purpose of determining 
whether prospective jurors (a) are eligible to serve based on legal 
restrictions, (b) will be able to consider in an impartial manner the 
information presented to them during trial, and (c) will be able to 
render a verdict based on the evidence of the trial rather than on 
extralegal factors.140  
This fact makes the media’s need for juror and prospective juror 
names a redundancy—hardly essential to the proper functioning of 
government, as the logic prong of Press-Enterprise II requires. The 
Supreme Court of Delaware encountered a similar issue when it was 
asked by media-intervenors to recognize that the announcement of 
juror names during a trial, an old Delaware practice, was part of their 
 
 138. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 238 (2008) (quoting In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139. JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE D. SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION 18 (2007) 
(“Voir dire has been used for several hundred years and in the United States can be traced to 
the 1760 Massachusetts Jury Selection Law.”). 
 140. Id. at 25. 
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right of access.141 However, because juror names were made available 
to the parties at issue, and because the trial proceedings were left 
“open to the public,” the Delaware Court held that this practice was 
a redundant formality that was unessential to the proper functioning 
of government.142 Likewise, the Third Circuit’s reasoning for 
requiring the publication of juror names prior to empanelment only 
chisels into constitutional stone a practice that is unessential.143  
Moreover, the Third Circuit’s holding discounts the role of voir 
dire, and builds the right of access up as its essential complement, 
rather than its beneficial supplement. Like the First Circuit,144 the 
Third Circuit found that the press’s role in a trial is important in 
exposing bias that might not otherwise be discovered among the 
empanelled jurors.145 Such may be true, making the right of access a 
helpful enhancement to voir dire. Nonetheless, listing its role in 
advancing fairness as a necessary reason for maintaining the right in 
spite of contravening interests also promotes the role of access from 
that of a welcome aid to that of a compulsory procedure. Juror 
names must now be made available in order to help ensure 
fairness.146 That argument assumes that voir dire is, by itself, 
inadequate. Yet, jury qualification is still determined by voir dire and 
not through the findings of the press. 
 
 141. Gannet Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 736, 739 (Del. 1989). 
 142. Id. at 751 (holding that the announcement of juror names was not necessary to 
provide constitutionally required openness in highly publicized trial proceedings). 
 143. Cf. In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1332 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
 144. See In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that 
“[j]uror bias or confusion might be uncovered” through a liberal right of access). 
 145. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 240 n.33 (2008) (“The District Court 
appears to believe that no good can come from any story published about a juror. As we noted 
above, however, press investigation of jurors might be beneficial in some cases by, for example, 
revealing possible sources of juror bias or deterring misrepresentation during voir dire.”). 
 146. Recall that the primary reason that the right of access permits the press to attend to 
judicial proceedings is to help protect the accused. Lewis F. Powell, The Right to a Fair Trial, 
51 A.B.A. J. 534, 538 (1965) (“We must bear in mind that the primary purpose of a public 
trial and of the media’s right as a part of the public to attend and report what occurs there is to 
protect the accused.”). It is interesting that juror information must be made available to the 
ress even when important interests of fairness are raised by the accused in demanding to keep 
them sealed. See supra Part IV.A. 
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2. The imprudent fossilization of process in an ever-changing 
atmosphere 
Secondly, the imposition of this supererogatory detail 
imprudently burdens the justice system by removing a discretionary 
tool that was effective in preserving trial impartiality in the face of an 
increasingly pervasive media.  
As early as the 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized the 
building pressure caused by the growing and evolving media and 
called for trial judges to take measures necessary to preserve the 
impartiality of their tribunals.147 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the 
petitioner was charged with beating his pregnant wife to death.148 
Later, when he refused to submit to questioning or a lie-detector 
test, the media interpreted this as a sign of his guilt.149 As the 
developing media circus escalated, the entire community became 
enwrapped in the drama, quickly devouring newspaper stories that 
“tended to incriminate [the accused],” and showing up in droves at 
hearings in order to observe the suspected killer.150 When the trial 
finally began, “[e]very juror, except one, testified at voir dire to 
reading about the case in the Cleveland papers or to having heard 
broadcasts about it.”151 Even more troubling was the fact that after 
“[a]ll three Cleveland newspapers published the names and addresses 
of the veniremen . . . , anonymous letters and telephone calls, as well 
as calls from friends, regarding the impending prosecution were 
received by all of the prospective jurors.”152 The Supreme Court later 
found that “the judge’s failure to insulate [the jurors] from reporters 
and photographers,” by allowing “numerous pictures of the jurors, 
with their addresses, [to appear] in the newspapers before and during 
the trial itself,” “thrust [them] into the role of celebrities”153 and 
denied the petitioner his due process rights to a fair and impartial 
trial.154 In response to these facts, and because of “the pervasiveness 
of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial 
publicity from the minds of the jurors,” the Supreme Court 
 
 147. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966). 
 148. Id. at 336. 
 149. Id. at 338–39. 
 150. Id. at 339–40. 
 151. Id. at 345. 
 152. Id. at 342. 
 153. Id. at 353. 
 154. Id. at 362–63. 
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mandated that “trial courts . . . take strong measures to ensure that 
the balance is never weighed against the accused” by using “rule and 
regulation that will protect their processes from outside 
interferences.”155 
The Supreme Court was not alone in promulgating rules that 
would aid in protecting the impartiality of jurors. Congress also came 
to the aid of judges by passing an act that codified a judge’s power to 
develop his or her own jury selection plan.156 Among other things, 
the act permits judges to “keep [juror] names confidential in any 
case where the interests of justice so require.”157 Furthermore, 
shortly after and in response to the Sheppard decision, the Judicial 
Conference recommended that judges, either on the motion of a 
party or sua sponte, issue a special order directing “that the names 
and addresses of jurors or prospective jurors not be publicly released 
except as required by statute,”158 when the circumstances 
surrounding the case would require it.159 
In 1980, after Richmond Newspapers recognized a right of access 
for the media to criminal trial proceedings, the Judicial Conference 
reconvened to update its stance in light of the new ruling.160 
However, even though all criminal trial proceedings were to 
henceforth be held under a “presumption of openness,”161 the 
Conference made the exact same recommendation.162 In the face of 
intense media publicity, the Conference believed that its 
recommendations would provide additional means for judges to 
fulfill their responsibility of protecting the impartiality of criminal 
trials.163 
These recommendations, made more than twenty years prior to 
Cyril Wecht’s corruption trial, have become increasingly important 
in the face of the changing media. Since the proposal of these 
recommendations, the media have become increasingly omnipresent 
with the introduction of the Internet. After its humble beginnings in 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2006). 
 157. § 1863(b)(7). 
 158. 45 F.R.D. 391, 410–11 (1968). 
 159. See id. at 409. 
 160. See 87 F.R.D. 518, 522–23 (1980). 
 161. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). 
 162. Compare 87 F.R.D. 518, 529–31 (1980), with 45 F.R.D. 391, 410–11 (1968). 
 163. 87 F.R.D. at 531. 
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1969,164 the Internet has experienced enormous growth. Between 
the years 2000 and 2009, Internet usage in North America increased 
134% to penetrate 74.2% of the population.165 Today, “with its 
almost infinitely complex worldwide web of strands and nodes, . . . 
[the Internet’s] reach extends as far as, and perhaps exceeds, that of 
newspapers and other traditional media.”166 Just as important, the 
Internet is an ever-changing medium, rapidly evolving as it continues 
to disseminate.167 Today, as a result of its reach and growth, any 
person—not to mention any politician or celebrity—can find himself 
or herself on YouTube in a matter of minutes after a blunder or 
misstep.168 The increased prevalence of the media has led to an 
increased possibility of abuse.  
Furthermore, the evolving media have limited the efficacy of 
other judicial tools. For example, a judge may order a change of 
venue when prejudice against a defendant in a trial district is so great 
that he or she would otherwise be unable to obtain a fair and 
impartial trial.169 However, the Internet and media have limited the 
use of this tool by expanding the reach of prejudicial information, 
and, in some cases, may even render it entirely ineffective.170 
Sensational stories and “viral videos” pass quickly throughout the 
Internet, penetrating both the frequented and the remote regions of 
the United States. With this veritable flood of information, it is often 
difficult to find people ignorant or unbiased toward any important 
story. O.J. Simpson’s recent trial is a good example of this. After 
 
 164. Paul C. Adams & Barney Warf, Introduction: Cyberspace and Geographical Space, 87 
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 139, 140 (1997). The beginnings of the Internet are found in a 
government project called the Arpanet (ARPA was an acronym standing for the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency), which connected four computers at centers at UCLA, UC Santa 
Barbara, Stanford, and the University of Utah. Id. 
 165. Internet Usage Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2010). 
 166. In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 167. John B. Horrigan, New Internet Users: What They Do Online, What They Don’t, and 
Implications for the ‘Net’s Future, TEX. MED. CENTER, http://www.sahs.uth.tmc.edu/ 
evbernstam/hi6308_materials/New_User_Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). 
 168. Paul Farhi, Blundering Pols Find Their Oops on Endless Loop of Internet Sites, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 3, 2006, at C1 (noting that politicians have often found their mistakes displayed 
on the Internet for all to see, repeated over and over). 
 169. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). 
 170. E.g., United States v. Cassell, No. CIV.A.706CR-00098-04, 2007 WL 419574, at 
*1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2007) (“Because the internet is available in every judicial district of 
which this court is aware, however, the risk that prospective jurors will encounter these stories 
cannot be cured by a change of venue.”). 
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participating in one of the most watched trials in the history of the 
United States,171 O.J. Simpson was acquitted of two counts of 
homicide in 1995.172 In 2008, when Simpson was on trial once 
again, this time for armed-robbery, all twelve empanelled jurors had 
heard of Simpson, and all but one knew that he had been acquitted 
in his 1995 trial.173 Even more important, almost half of the jurors in 
that case felt that he was guilty of the 1995 murders and should not 
have been acquitted.174 This is in spite of the fact that the original 
crime, more than ten years before, occurred in another state.  
In light of Sheppard and the many efforts of courts and 
politicians to provide the judicial system with a means of adapting to 
the changing environment within constitutional boundaries, a 
judge’s discretionary freedom to withhold juror names and addresses 
during trial proceedings becomes an indispensible tool in preserving 
the rights of the accused in a trial. Considering the facts surrounding 
the Wecht case, such a rule would hardly seem out of the ordinary. 
Dr. Wecht is a well-known individual, having already written several 
books,175 and appeared on national television at least ten times since 
2003.176 In addition, in Pennsylvania, Dr. Wecht’s political career has 
kept him in the news since the late 1960s, having even challenged 
the incumbent Senator from Pennsylvania in the 1982 election.177 
 
 171. George Lipsitz, “The Greatest Story Ever Sold: Marketing and the O.J. Simpson 
Trial,” in GAIL DINES & JEAN MCMAHON HUMEZ, GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN MEDIA: A 
TEXT-READER 179 (Gail Dines & Jean McMahon Humez eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
 172. Simpson Acquitted, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 4, 1995, at A1. 
 173. Arthur Brice, 5 O.J. Simpson Jurors Disagreed with 1995 Acquittal, CNN.com, Oct. 
5, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/04/simpson.jury/index.html. 
 174. Id.; William M. Welch, Simpson Jury Held Strong Views on 1995 Acquittal, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 6, 2008, at 3A. 
 175. E.g., CYRIL H. WECHT ET AL., MORTAL EVIDENCE: THE FORENSICS BEHIND NINE 
SHOCKING CASES (2003); ROXANA FERLLINI & CYRIL WECHT, SILENT WITNESS: HOW 
FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY IS USED TO SOLVE THE WORLD’S TOUGHEST CRIMES (2002); 
CYRIL WECHT, CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION (2004); CYRIL H. WECHT & CHARLES 
BOSWORTH, WHO KILLED JONBENET RAMSEY? (1998); CYRIL WECHT ET AL., GRAVE 
SECRETS: A LEADING FORENSIC EXPERT REVEALS THE STARTLING TRUTH ABOUT O.J. 
SIMPSON, DAVID KORESH, VINCENT FOSTER, AND OTHER SENSATIONAL CASES (1996); 
CYRIL H. WECHT ET AL., PREPARING AND WINNING MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES (2d ed. 
1994); CYRIL H. WECHT ET AL., CAUSE OF DEATH (1994); CYRIL H. WECHT ET AL., 2 
HANDLING SOFT TISSUE INJURY CASES: MEDICAL ASPECTS (1993). 
 176. Internet Movie Database, Cyril H. Wecht, http://www.imdb.com/name/ 
nm0917064/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
 177. Where It’s Politics in the Raw, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1982 at 32 
(noting that during this particular year, the race between the incumbent H. John Heinz III 
and Cyril Wecht was one of several especially charged races). 
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Such details ensure a strong Internet presence and publicity for Dr. 
Wecht;178 indeed, at the beginning of trial proceedings and 
throughout the trial, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review maintained a 
website specifically dedicated to covering the Wecht trial.179  
Unfortunately, the Wecht court did not take into account any of 
those factors, or at least did not find them compelling enough to 
maintain the former order of priorities. As a result, Wecht is set to 
fossilize the criminal trial process in the face of a constantly evolving 
media. The media have and will continue to become increasingly 
prevalent, adapting in order to reach larger audiences. In spite of 
this, Wecht seeks to remove from the judiciary a valuable tool that 
not only effectively upholds the right of the accused to a fair trial, 
but also preserves the media’s right of access to the fullest extent 
possible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The American judicial system places upon judges the incredible 
responsibility of ensuring trial impartiality for the benefit of the 
accused and grants them tremendous latitude in fulfilling those 
duties. Of course, competing rights—such as the public’s right of 
access to trial proceedings—balance that judicial liberty. 
Nevertheless, it is up to the trial judge to weigh those competing 
rights, and then to direct traffic accordingly, ensuring that ancillary 
rights yield to the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
However, as a result of an “impermissible micro-management of 
procedures and decisions that are properly delegated to the 
discretion of district judges,”180 the Third Circuit disrupted the 
normal flow of traffic. United States v. Wecht forcefully tips the scales 
in favor of the public, at the expense of the accused. This decision 
changes the essential priority of the jury trial system from a truth-
seeking forum to a forum created to give the “appearance of justice.” 
 
 178. One interesting detail, and measure of a person’s web presence may be found by 
simply performing a Google search. For Dr. Wecht, a Google search for the words “Dr. Cyril 
H. Wecht” produced 40,000 hits, http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Dr.+Cyril+H. 
+Wecht%22 (last visited Sept. 25, 2009), and a search for “Cyril Wecht” produced 31,000 hits 
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Cyril+Wecht%22 (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). 
 179. PITT. TRIB.-REV., Dr. Cyril H. Wecht Trial, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/ 
x/pittsburghtrib/news/specialreports/wecht/trial/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).  
 180. United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 243 (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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In addition, this decision imprudently restrains the judicial system 
from adapting to challenges from an ever-changing media by 
confiscating a portion of judicial discretion.  
As with real roads, when signs fail to properly signal who 
maintains the right-of-way, collisions are bound to happen. The 
victim in this case will most probably be some hapless individual 
who, either unlucky enough to be accused of a particularly heinous 
crime, or exceptionally famous or notorious prior to his or her 
trial,181 is irreparably harmed because a Third Circuit court simply 
lacked the means “to control the publicity about [a] trial.”182  
Landon Wade Magnusson 
 
 
 181. In the case of the unfortunately famous Dr. Wecht, his own trial came to an 
intriguing conclusion—which was entertainingly filled with as much fanfare as its beginning. 
First, on remand, Dr. Wecht’s trial ended in a hung jury, Jason Cato, Wecht Trial Over: Feds to 
Try Again, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Apr. 8, 2008, at a cost of over $204,000 to federal taxpayers, 
Jason Cato, Cost of Wecht’s Case Put at $204,000, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Apr. 6, 2008. Not pleased 
with the outcome, federal prosecutors worked to pursue a second trial and had the original 
trial judge, the Honorable Arthur Schwab, removed for alleged bias “toward the prosecution.” 
Jason Cato, Judge Removed from Wecht Case, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Sept. 5, 2008. In addition, the 
prosecution hoped to move the trial from the Pittsburgh area to Erie, Pennsylvania, claiming 
that the “intense media coverage” in Pittsburgh was making “it nearly impossible to pick an 
unbiased jury . . . .” Jason Cato, Wecht Lawyers File Papers Opposing Moving Trial to Erie, 
PITT. TRIB.-REV., Dec. 20, 2008. Eventually, however, federal prosecutors dropped all charges 
against Dr. Wecht, Jason Cato, Remaining Counts Against Ex-coroner Wecht Are Dropped, 
PITT. TRIB.-REV., June 2, 2009, leaving him free to write, lecture, and appear on television in 
the future in order to work to pay off the immense debt that he accrued in attorney’s fees. 
Paula Reed Ward, Deep in Debt but Delighted, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 3, 2009, at A1. 
 182. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357 (1966). 
   LL.M. candidate, June 2011, École de droit de la Sorbonne, Université Paris I 
Panthéon-Sorbonne. J.D. 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
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